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Bales and Gerano: Oddball Arbitration

ODDBALL ARBITRATION
RichardA. Bales & Mark B. Gerano*

I. INTRODUCTION
Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA") in 1925 to
require courts to enforce arbitration agreements between merchants who
wanted to keep their disputes out of the court system so the disputes
could be resolved relatively quickly, economically, and amicably.'
Arbitration works relatively well in this context, where both parties
know what they are getting when they agree to arbitration and their
roughly equal bargaining power helps ensure that arbitral procedures are
fair.2
Over the last three decades, the United States Supreme Court has
extended the scope of the FAA into employment and consumer
arbitration, far beyond the commercial context for which it originally
was designed.3 Although the Court's arbitration jurisprudence treats
arbitration in these three contexts identically, employment and consumer
arbitration create policy concerns not extant in commercial arbitration.
Most employment and consumer arbitration clauses are drafted by a
company and imposed on employees or consumers on a take-it-or-leaveit basis.4 Consumers and employees may not understand what they are
agreeing to, and often agree to arbitration terms and procedures that are
lopsidedly slanted to favor the company.5
* Rick Bales, Dean, Ohio Northern University Claude W. Pettit College of Law. At the
time this article was written, Dean Bales was Professor of Law and Director of the Advocacy
Center, Northern Kentucky University, Salmon P. Chase College of Law. Mark Gerano is a
2014 J.D. candidate at the Northern Kentucky University, Salmon P. Chase College of Law.
1. See Michael Z. Green, Preempting Justice through Binding Arbitration of Future
Disputes: Mere Adhesion Contracts or a Trap for the Unwary Consumer?, 5 LOY. CONSUMER L.
REP. 112,112-113 (1993).
2. Id. at 119.
3. See Richard A. Bales, The Laissez-FaireArbitration Market and the Needfor a Unform
FederalStandardGoverning Employment and Consumer Arbitration, 52 U. KAN. L. REv. 583, 584
(2004).
4. See Richard A. Bales & Sue Irion, How Congress Can Make a More EquitableFederal
ArbitrationAct, 113 PENN. ST. L. REV. 1081, 1083 (2009).
5. See Michelle Eviston & Richard A. Bales, Capping the Costs of Consumer and
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Recent Supreme Court cases have extended the FAA far beyond
what either the text of the statute or the intent of the Congress that
enacted it would permit.6 The Court has done so using cases with fact
patterns that are wildly atypical of the cases that usually arise in the
lower courts.? The Court has used these atypical-fact cases to create
pro-arbitration legal precedent that applies equally to the typical cases
that much more commonly appear in the lower courts.8 The precedent
created in atypical fact cases, while perhaps creating a just outcome in
those atypical cases themselves, can create unjust outcomes in the farmore-common typical fact cases. Bad facts make bad law.
Suja Thomas, writing in the contexts of employment discrimination
and federal pleading standards, calls these atypical fact cases "oddball"
cases, and has developed a framework for describing and analyzing
them.9 This essay extends Thomas's "oddball" framework to two cases
recently decided, and one case imminently to be decided in the
arbitration context.
This essay argues that the Supreme Court has chosen for its
arbitration docket a set of cases with wholly atypical fact patterns in
what appears to be a deliberate effort successful so far to advance its
pro-arbitration policy agenda without provoking a political backlash.
This article begins by discussing the early interpretations of the FAA.
Part IIB discusses the expansion of the FAA including Prima Paint and
the Mitsubishi trilogy. Part IIC analyzes the holding in Gilmer and the
FAA's springboard into employment law. Part IID) describes the postGilmer attempts to limit the FAA. Part III describes the Court's use of
oddball cases to further expand arbitration doctrine. Part IV analyzes the
Court's pro-arbitration agenda, and demonstrates how using oddball
cases to create policy furthers this agenda. Part V concludes.
II. BACKGROUND AND APPLICABLE LAW

A. The Early Years of the FAA
After Congress passed the FAA in 1925, courts narrowly
interpreted its scope and application. 0 Initially limited to federal courts,
Employment Arbitration,42 U. TOL. L. REv. 903, 904 (2011).
6. See infra, Part III.
7. See infra Part III.A.
8. See infra Part IA.
9. See infra Part III.A.
10. See Joshua R. Welch, Has the Expansion of the FederalArbitrationAct Gone too Far?:
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the FAA was restricted by the decision in Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins. 1
The Erie Court held that a federal court, sitting in diversity jurisdiction,
must apply state substantive law and federal procedural law.' 2 Because
of Erie, a federal court sitting in diversity jurisdiction could not enforce
the FAA.13 Since early arbitration agreements were mostly commercial
agreements and involved contract disputes, courts were forced to apply
state contract law and state arbitration law that could be less friendly
than the FAA. 14 If the FAA were merely a procedural rule to be used in
federal courts, its application would be very limited because state
contract law including state arbitration law would govern these
disputes."s Arbitration advocates needed to make arbitration a federal,
substantive law so its application would be more widespread.' 6 This
dilemma set the stage for the dramatic expansion of arbitration doctrine
in the United States.
B. The JudicialExpansion of the FAA: Creatinga NationalLaw
1. The Creation of a National Substantive Law: PrimaPaint Corp.
In 1967, the Court fixed the issues created by Erie in Prima Paint
Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co. 17 In Prima Paint, the Court
addressed whether Congress relied on its commerce power or its Article
III power to create the rules of decision in diversity jurisdiction
situations.18 If the FAA were classified as a substantive law, created
under the commerce power, federal courts could apply it when sitting in
diversity jurisdiction.19 If the FAA were classified as an Article III
created law, it would be purely procedural, and courts would be forced
to apply state substantive law rather than the FAA when sitting in
diversity jurisdiction.20
Enforcing ArbitrationClauses in Void Ab Initio Contracts, 86 MARQ. L. REv. 581, 588 (2002).
11. See Thomas E. Carbonneau, The Revolution in Law Through Arbitration, 56 CLEV. ST. L.
REv. 233, 249 (2008) (discussing the significant impact of the Erie decision on the FAA).
12. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938).
13. See Carbonneau, supranote 11, at 249.
14. Id.
15. See Welch, supranote 10, at 589.
16. Id
17. Prima Paint Corp. v. Flood & Conklin Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 395 (1967).
18. See id. at 405.
19. See id. at 404-05.
20. See id. at 422-25 (Black, J., dissenting) (arguing that FAA is purely procedural and
Congress did not intend to "take away from the States their power to interpret contracts made by
their own citizens in their own territory").
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In circumventing the problem that Erie created, the Court in Prima
Paint held that the FAA was created under the commerce power, thus
making it a substantive law.2' The Court held that "it is clear beyond
dispute that the federal arbitration statute is based upon and confined to
the incontestable federal foundations of 'control over interstate
commerce and over admiralty." 2 2
2. Arbitration's Initial Roadblock in Employment Law: Gardner-Denver
In 1974 the Court decided in Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo. that
a mandatory arbitration clause in a collective bargaining agreement
("CBA") was unenforceable with respect to Title VII claims. 23 GardnerDenver recognized that it was not acceptable for the FAA to foreclose an
employee's rights under a federal anti-discrimination statute.24
Gardner-Denver involved an African American steel worker,
Harrell Alexander Sr., who was terminated from his position as a drill
operator in training. 25 Alexander was terminated approximately fifteen
months after he began the trainee position.2 6 According to the company,
he was terminated because he made too many defective parts and was
performing poorly.27 Because he was a member of the United
Steelworkers of America ("the union"), Alexander filed a grievance
challenging his firing.2 8 Alexander believed he was discharged unfairly,
but did not explicitly raise any issue regarding his race until later in the
proceedings. 29 The contract between the union and the company
provided disputes between the company and the union were to be
submitted to a grievance procedure that ended with final and binding
arbitration. 30
Just prior to arbitration, Alexander first raised the claim that his
discharge "resulted from racial discrimination," and also submitted a
claim to the EEOC." Shortly thereafter, he lost in arbitration, and the

21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

See id at 405.
Id.
See Alexander v. Gardner-DenverCo., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974).
Id.
Id. at 38.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 39.
Id.
Id at 40.
Id. at 42.
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EEOC informed him that his complaint lacked probable cause.32 He
took his case to federal district court and the case was dismissed because
he had voluntarily submitted his case to arbitration, was bound by the
arbitral decision, and thus his rights to court under Title VII had been
precluded. The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision.34
The court's decision restricted Alexander from filing a lawsuit under
Title VII and made the arbitrator's decision his sole remedy.
The Supreme Court was faced with the decision of whether
Alexander's Title VII claims were foreclosed by his decision to pursue
his claims in arbitration.36 The Court discussed the legislative intent of
Title VII, specifically that "Title VII was designed to supplement, rather
than supplant, existing laws and institutions related to employment
discrimination." 3 7 "Title VII's purpose and procedures strongly suggest
that an individual does not forfeit his private cause of action if he first
pursues his grievance to final arbitration .

. .

."

The Court also

distinguished an employee's "contract" rights under a collective
bargaining agreement, and his "independent statutory rights accorded by
Congress."3 9 "The distinctly separate nature of these contractual and
statutory rights is not vitiated merely because both were violated as a
result of the same factual occurrence."40
Gardner-Denver was important because the Court dismissed the
idea that an employee waived its rights by submitting a claim to
arbitration. 4 1 The Court's critical holding was that if an employee could
waive its rights in a collective-bargaining agreement, then Title VII's
paramount purpose of freeing individuals from discrimination would be
undermined. 4 2 Gardner-Denverrepresents that allowing such rights to
be waived is a violation of clear public policy. 43 It would seem apparent
that similar precedent would follow for other types of employment
claims under statutes like the ADA and the ADEA since the legislative
purposes are similar.44 Although Gardner-Denverprotected employee
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 346 F.Supp 1012, 1013 (D. Colo. 1971).
415 U.S. at 43.
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 466 F.2d 1209, 1210 (10th Cir. 1972).
Id.
415 U.S. at 48-49.
Id.
Id at 49.
Id. at 49-50.
Id. at 50.
Id. at 51-53.
See id at 51.
See id.
See M. Lane Lowrey, Arbitration or Adjudication?: The Trials and Tribulations of the
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rights from being foreclosed on by arbitration agreements, it did not
address or base its decision on the FAA and its liberal policy favoring
arbitration. Following the decision in Gardner-Denver, the Supreme
Court decided a number of cases that dramatically expanded the FAA's
application. The next section discusses a number of these cases.
3. Expansion of Arbitration Doctrine into Substantive Law in the Early
1980s
The first case that expanded the FAA's scope was Moses H. Cone
Memorial Hospital v. Mercury Construction Corp.4 5 Moses H. Cone
involved two businesses under contract to arbitrate all disputes.46 The
parties got into a dispute and the hospital attempted to get a declaratory
judgment in state court to avoid being forced to arbitrate and to preclude
any liability to the construction company.47 In an effort to resolve the
dispute and force arbitration, Mercury Construction Company filed a
parallel suit in federal court. 4 8 The district court issued a stay pending
the outcome of the state litigation. 4 9 The Fourth Circuit reversed and
ordered the district court to compel arbitration.50 The Supreme Court
affirmed and compelled arbitration, applying federal law."'
The
important aspect of Moses H Cone was the Court's declaration that the
FAA applied in both federal and state courts. 52 Equally important in
Moses H. Cone was the Court's recognition of the strong policy favoring
arbitration, and that when in doubt regarding arbitrability, the preference
should be to arbitrate.
In 1984, the Court further expanded the scope of arbitration and
held that the FAA applies even in situations involving a comprehensive
state regulatory scheme.54 Southland Corp. v. Keating involved a
dispute between a franchisor and several franchisees. The parties had a
franchise agreement that contained an arbitration clause that stated,
Federal Circuit Split Over Mandatory Arbitration of Employment Discrimination Claims, 40 S.
TEX. L. REv. 993, 1012-1016 (1999).
45. 460 U.S. 1 (1983).
46. Id at 4-5.
47. Id. at 7.
48. Id

49.

Id

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Id. at 8.
Id. at 4.
Id. at 24.
Id.
See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 2 (1984).
Id at 3-4.
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"[a]ny controversy or claim arising out of or relating to this Agreement
or the breach hereof shall be settled by arbitration in accordance with the
Rules of the American Arbitration Association ... and judgment upon
any award rendered by the arbitrator may be entered in any court having
jurisdiction thereof."06 Several of the franchise owners sued under state
franchise law, and the franchisor responded by attempting to compel
arbitration.57 The trial court held the FAA did not apply to the actions
filed under the franchise law. The state court of appeals reversed and
decided that if the franchising law made arbitration agreements
involving commerce invalid, then it would conflict with the FAA and,
thus, be unenforceable under the Supremacy Clause. 59 The California
Supreme Court reversed the appeals court and held the franchise law did
not conflict with the FAA.60 The United States Supreme Court then
granted certiorai and discussed the congressional intent in enacting the
FAA and recognized that when enacting the FAA, one of the purposes
was "to foreclose state legislative attempts to undercut the enforceability
of arbitration agreements. "61 Because the franchising law was
contradictory to congressional intent, the Court applied the Supremacy
Clause and held that the FAA applied.62 Southland marked another
expansion of the FAA, and reaffirmed the holdings in Prima Paint and
Moses H. Cone that the FAA was a substantive federal law that applied
in state courts.
The next case that expanded arbitration doctrine in the early 1980s
was Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd.63 Dean Witter Reynolds
involved a dispute between a broker and a client where the client alleged
the broker violated several laws by causing the client to lose significant
money out of an investment account.M The client sued the broker in
federal court for violations of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 and
for several state claims.
The federal court had diversity jurisdiction
66
over the state claims. When the client invested money with the broker,
the parties signed an arbitration agreement that stated, "[a]ny

56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.

Id. at 4.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 5.
Id
Id. at 16.
Id.
470 U.S. 213 (1985).
Id. at 214.
Id
Id.
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controversy between you and the undersigned arising out of or relating
to this contract or the breach thereof, shall be settled by arbitration." 67
Once a dispute between the parties arose, the broker sought to compel
arbitration over the state claims.6' The issue for the Court was whether
in the situation involving both arbitrable and non-arbitrable claims,
should the Court compel arbitration on all the claims or should the Court
deny arbitration on all the claims and try them together in federal court.69
The circuits are divided on this question.70 In deciding the case, the
Court again displayed its preference toward the expansion of arbitration
and overruled this "intertwining doctrine," further closing any potential
loopholes for parties to avoid arbitration in state actions.7
In 1985 the Court cast its liberal policy favoring arbitration in
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.72 Mitsubishi

Motors involved a dispute between an auto manufacturer and an auto
distributor. Both parties agreed to a sales agreement containing an
arbitration clause.74 The parties got into a dispute on multiple grounds,
including claims that Soler had violated the Sherman Act. The district
court referred all of the issues except the issue involving the Sherman
Act to arbitration.76 In keeping the Sherman Act issues out of
arbitration, the district court recognized that federal antitrust issues were
67. Id. at 215.
68. Id. He did not seek to compel arbitration of the federal security claim because he
assumed that Security Exchange Act claim was not arbitrable. Id.

69.

See id. at 216.

70. Id. The Ninth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have relied on the "doctrine of intertwining."
"When arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims arise out of the same transaction, and are sufficiently
intertwined factually and legally, the district court, under this view, may in its discretion deny
arbitration as to the arbitrable claims and try all the claims together in federal court." Id. "In
contrast, the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Circuits have held that the Arbitration Act divests the
district courts of any discretion regarding arbitration in cases containing both arbitrable and
nonarbitrable claims, and instead requires that the courts compel arbitration of arbitrable claims,
when asked to do so." Id. at 217.
71. Seeidat217.
72. 473 U.S. 614, 626-27 (1985) ("[W]e are well past the time when judicial suspicion of the
desirability of arbitration and of the competence of arbitral tribunals inhibited the development of
arbitration as an alternative means of dispute resolution. Just last Term in Southland Corp....
where we held that § 2 of the Act declared a national policy applicable equally in state as well as
federal courts, we construed an arbitration clause to encompass the disputes at issue without pausing
at the source in a state statute of the rights asserted by the parties resisting arbitration.").
73. Id. at 617.
74. Id.
75. Id. at 619-20. Specifically, "Soler alleged that Mitsubishi and CISA had conspired to
divide markets in restraint of trade", in violation of the §1 of the Sherman Act, which prohibits
conspiracy "in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations." Id.
at 620; see also 15 U.S.C. §1 (2006).
76. Id.at620-21.
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"of a character inappropriate for enforcement by arbitration,"n but
because the claims were of an international character, all the claims must
move forward to arbitration.
The First Circuit reversed in part with
respect to the arbitration of the antitrust claims.79 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine whether an antitrust claim with
international character should be resolved in arbitration.o
The Court held that the international arbitration agreement on the
antitrust claims was enforceable.81 The Court again affirmed its liberal
policy favoring arbitration and noted that agreeing to arbitrate a statutory
claim does not foreclose the rights of the party, but rather simply
commits their resolution to the arbitral forum as opposed to a judicial
forum. 82 After Mitsubishi Motors Corp., the Court applied similar
reasoning to cases in the employment context. The next section of this
article discusses the expansion of arbitration into cases involving
statutory employment rights.
C. Gilmer: Arbitration'sSpringboardinto Employment Disputes
In Gardner-Denver, the Court held collective-bargaining
agreements that confine resolution of statutory anti-discrimination rights
to arbitration were unenforceable. The case limited the enforcement of
compulsory arbitration of statutory employment discrimination claims;
however the Court would dramatically change this posture in 1991 by
deciding the case Gilmer v. Interstate/JohnsonLane Corp.84
Plaintiff Robert Gilmer was an employee of Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corporation ("Interstate").
In the course of his employment,
Gilmer was required to register as a securities representative with the
New York Stock Exchange (NYSE).
His registration application
included an agreement to arbitrate "when required to by NYSE rules."
NYSE Rule 347 requires arbitration for "any controversy arising out of a

77. Id. at 621 (citing Am. Safety Equip. Corp. v. J.P. Maguire & Co., 391 F.2d 821, 825 (2d
Cir. 1968)).
78. Id. at 621.
79. Id. at 621-23.
80. Id. at 624.
81. Id. at 640.
82. Id. at 628.
83. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 59-60 (1974).
84. Lowrey, supranote 44, at 998.
85. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 20 (1991).
86. Id
87. Id.
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of
or
termination
employment
registered - representative's
at
Interstate
by
terminated
subsequently
was
Gilmer
employment.
age sixty-two and filed a charge and then brought suit in district court
claiming Interstate violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act
of 1967 (ADEA). 89 Interstate moved to compel arbitration of the
claims. 90 The district court denied the motion, and relied on the previous
9' The district court concluded that like
precedent in Gardner-Denver.
Title VII, the ADEA contained congressional intent "to protect ADEA
claimants from a waiver of judicial forum." 92 The Fourth Circuit
reversed the district court finding that "nothing in the text, legislative
history, or underlying purposes of the ADEA" indicated a congressional
intent to preclude enforcing this type of arbitration agreement. 3 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari to decide whether an ADEA claimant
can be subjected to compulsory arbitration and answered the question in
the affirmative.9 4
In making its determination, the Court started by analyzing the
purpose of the FAA, and its application in previous cases to nonemployment statutory rights.95 The Court noted the FAA's requirement
that arbitration clauses be enforced unless some type of normal contract
defense is present, and again recognized the perceived liberal policy
favoring the enforcement of arbitration agreements that was established
in Moses H. Cone.96 Then the Court applied its previous doctrine from
Mitsubishi Motors Corp. which states that claims arising under various
statutory schemes were arbitrable.9 ' The Court reasoned that "[b]y
agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not forgo the
substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits their resolution
in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum." 98
The second issue the Court addressed was whether Congress
intended claims under the ADEA to be inappropriate for arbitration.99
88.
89.
90.

Id.
Id.
Id

91.

Id at 24.

92.
93.
1990)).
94.
95.

96.
97.
98.
(1985)).
99.

Id. at 20.
Id at 24 (quoting Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 895 F.2d 195, 197 (4th Cir.
Id. at 23.
See id. at 24, 26.

See id at 25.
Id at 26
Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 628
See id. at 26-27.
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The ADEA was passed to promote the broad social purpose of
prohibiting arbitrary age discrimination of older persons in employment
settings.' 00 The Court compared the ADEA's broad social purpose to
that of the Sherman Act, the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, RICO,
and the Securities Act of 1933, all of which may have claims referred to
arbitration.'o' "[S]o long as the prospective litigant effectively may
vindicate [his or her] statutory cause of action in the arbitral forum" the
issue is appropriate for arbitration.102 The Gilmer opinion suggested that
arbitration is a one-size-fits-all shirt to the variable shaped body of
employment law.
With Gilmer's holding still in place, today's employees with a
statutory cause of action that wish to pursue their claims in court are
fighting an uphill battle if they are under a contract containing an
arbitration clause. Gilmer stands for the fact that employment disputes
do not have unique characteristics that make them different from
disputes under antitrust or securities statutes, and suggests that anything
is arbitrable unless the text or legislative history "explicitly preclude[s]
arbitration or other nonjudicial resolution." 0 3 Since the current antidiscrimination statutes do not "explicitly" preclude arbitral resolution,
this seems to be an impossible standard to meet. The next section of this
article argues that claims under employment statutes are different from
others, and discusses the small window that the Court has opened in
Gilmer to allow certain types of disputes to proceed in court despite the
presence of an arbitration provision. Following Gilmer, there have been
a number of failed attempts to limit the FAA. The next section briefly
discusses some of these legislative attempts.
D. Post-GilmerFailedAttempts to Limit the FAA
Since Gilmer, there have been a number of attempts by Congress to
step in and restore the FAA to its original purpose.104 Beginning in
1994, Congress attempted to amend the anti-discrimination statutes
themselves.105 The Protection From Coercive Employment Agreements

100. Id. at 27.
101. Id. at 28.
102. Id. (quoting Mitsubishi Motors, 473 U.S. at 637).
103. See id. at 29.
104. See Brian K. Van Engen, Post-Gilmer Developments in Mandatory Arbitration: The
Expansion of Mandatory Arbitrationfor Statutory Claims and the CongressionalEffort to Reverse
the Trend, 21 J. CORP. L. 391,410 & n. 209 (1996).
105. Id at410-11.
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Act, which was introduced but never enacted, sought to amend a number
of anti-discrimination statutes by making it "illegal to condition
employment on submission to mandatory arbitration." 106 The bill
contained a number of specific provisions that made it unlawful for
employers to conduct any adverse employment action or fail to hire an
employee based on the employee's refusal to agree to an arbitration
provision.10 7 A second attempt to limit the power of the FAA occurred
in August of 1994 when the Civil Rights Procedure Protection Act of
1994 was introduced in both the House and Senate. 08 The bill would
have amended the FAA by adding the language "[t]his chapter shall not
apply with respect to a claim of unlawful discrimination if such claim
arises from discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex, national
origin, age, or disability." 09
Most recently, some members of Congress have demonstrated they
will not give up on attempting to amend and limit the FAA. On March
8, 2012, House Resolution 4181 was introduced."10 H.R. 4181 seeks to
amend the FAA by adding in the language, "[n]otwithstanding any other
provision of this title, no predispute arbitration agreement shall be valid
or enforceable if it requires arbitration of an employment dispute.'' The
term 'employment dispute' means a dispute between an employer and
employee arising out of the relationship of employer and employee."ll 2
The bill has been referred to committee, but no further action has taken
place." 3 Each of these bills recognizes congressional attempts to limit
the Court's interpretation of the FAA through statutory amendment, but
none have been successful.114 Notwithstanding the lack of success of
Congress to amend the FAA, the Court has continued on its path of
expansion of the FAA in a number of recent decisions. The next section
of this article discusses some of these recent decisions, and highlights
some of the flawed reasoning behind them.
106.

Id. at 411.

107.
108.
109.
110.

Id.
Id. at 411 & n.218.
Id. at 412 & n.223.
H.R. 4181, 112th Cong. (2012).

111.

Id. § 2(b).

112. Id.
113. H.R. 4181 (112'h): To amend title 9, United States Code, to exclude employment contracts
and
employment
disputes
from
such
title,
Gov
TRACK,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/ 12/hr4181 (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
114. Id.; S. 2012 (103'): Protection From Coercive Employment Agreements Act, Gov

TRACK, http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/103/s2012 (last visited Apr. 16, 2013); H.R. 4981
(103'd):

Civil

Rights

Procedures

Protection

Act

of

1994,

Gov

TRACK,

http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/103/hr4981 (last visited Apr. 16, 2013).
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III. THE ODDBALL TRILOGY

A number of decisions have affirmed the holdings in Gilmer and
Mitsubishi over the past several years, and the Court has consistently
upheld its liberal policy favoring arbitration. In continuing to uphold its
policy and expand arbitration doctrine, the Court has used several
"oddball" cases to develop its doctrine. The problem with using oddball
cases to create precedent is that their atypical facts permit the Court to
create legal rules that, while perhaps creating a just outcome in the
oddball case itself, create unjust outcomes in the typical cases that much
more commonly appear in the lower courts. For example, the Court's
use of oddball arbitration cases has allowed the Court to extend the FAA
far beyond what would otherwise be justified by the text of the statute,
public opinion, or effective employee and consumer protection laws.115
This section of the article explains the "oddball-case" principle, and
discusses three cases with atypical facts in which the Court has
significantly expanded (or in one case is expected to significantly
expand) the scope of the FAA.
A. What is an OddballCase?
Professor Suja Thomas presented and analyzed the concept of an
oddball case in her 2011 article Oddball Iqbal and Twombly and
Employment Discrimination.'6 Professor Thomas argued that the Court
has applied "oddball reasoning" in the employment discrimination
context by creating precedent using cases with atypical fact patterns that
do not represent normal employment discrimination cases."' Professor
Thomas illustrated how the Court used oddball facts in two cases to
create a standard in employment discrimination that does not work for
the vast majority of other cases.' 18
Professor Thomas has created a four-part test for determining
whether a case is an "oddball case."''9 The four parts of the test are:
115. See Andrew Trask, Rhetoric - Oddball Cases and Slaughtered Hogs, CLASS ACTION
COUNTERMEASURES,
(Mar.
22,
2012),
http://www.classactioncountermeasures.com/2012/03/articles/strategy-1/rhetoric-oddball-cases-andslaughtered-hogs/.
116. See Suja A. Thomas, Oddball Iqbal and Twombly and Employment Discrimination,2011
U. ILL. L. REv. 215 (2010).
117. Seeid at216,224.
118. See id. at 224.
119. Andrew Trask, Notes from Depaul Class-Action Symposium, CLASS ACTION
COUNTERMEASURES, (Mar. 8, 2012), http://www.classactioncountermeasures.com/2012/03/
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"(1) odd facts that create[] (2) a significant change in the law, where the
change is (3) motivated by the odd facts rather than the legal principles,
and has (4) a significant effect on less-oddball cases in the same area of
law." 20 This essay extends Professor Thomas' theory of oddball cases
to a new context: arbitration cases.
B. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett - An OddballAttempt to Limit GardnerDenver
In 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, the Court decided whether a
provision in a collective-bargaining agreement that "clearly and
unmistakably" required a bargaining unit member to arbitrate
discrimination claims was enforceable.' 2 ' In 14 Penn Plaza LLC, the
Court evaluated a very specific arbitration waiver of statutory rights and
decided that such a waiver resulted in the bargaining-unit member's
claims limited to resolution in the arbitral forum.12 2 This section of the
article reviews the atypical facts of 14 Penn Plaza LLC, and analyzes
why it is an oddball case with reasoning that is not applicable to the
majority of decisions.
1. Case Description
Respondent Pyett and other respondents were members of the
Service Employees International Union, Local 32BJ ("Union"), who
worked as night watchmen in a New York office building.123 The
building operators contracted with an outside company to provide
licensed security guards in the lobby and entrances of its building thus
forcing the watchmen into other jobs like light duty cleaning.12 4 The
respondents alleged that the job reassignment led to a loss of income,
emotional distress, and that the new positions were much less

desirable.12 5
After their reassignment, the union members filed a grievance
based on a number of issues including that 14 Penn Plaza had violated
the collective-bargaining agreement's ban on workplace discrimination

articles/certification- 1/notes-from-depaul-class-action-symposium/.
120. Id
121. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett 556 U.S. 247, 251 (2009).
122. Id.at 273-74.

123.
124.

Id. at 251-52.
Id. at 252-53.

125.

Id at 253.
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by reassigning them based upon their age.1 26 The agreement contained
the following explicit provision ("Section 30"):
§ 30 NO DISCRIMINATION: There shall be no discrimination against
any present or future employee by reason of race, creed, color, age,
disability, national origin, sex, union membership, or any other
characteristic protected by law, including, but not limited to, claims
made pursuant to Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Americans with
Disabilities Act, the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the New
York State Human Rights Code,.. . or any other similar laws, rules, or
regulations. All such claims shall be subject to the grievance and
arbitration procedures as the sole and exclusive remedy for violations.
Arbitrators shall apply appropriate law in rendering decisions based
upon claims of discrimination.
During the grievance process the union removed the age
discrimination claims from arbitration because it believed it could not
legitimately object to the reassignments as discriminatory. 28 The union
members then sued in federal court.129 The district court denied 14 Penn
Plaza's motion to compel arbitration, and the court of appeals affirmed
relying on Gardner-Denver's holding that a collective bargaining
agreement could not waive covered workers' rights to a judicial forum
for causes of action created by Congress. 3 0 The Supreme Court
reversed the Second Circuit, holding a provision in a collectivebargaining agreement that clearly and unmistakably requires members to
arbitrate ADEA claims is fully enforceable.13'
In its analysis, the Supreme Court first dismissed the argument that
the arbitration clause was outside the scope of the collective bargaining
process because it affected the employees' individual rights as opposed
to only their economic rights.13 2 Applying the Gilmer holding stating
that parties were bound to arbitrate unless Congress manifested a
contrary intent, the Court found that no such intent was manifested in the
ADEA, the parties freely negotiated the agreement to arbitrate, and the
judiciary should honor the agreement.133 Second, the Court dismissed
126.

Id. at 253.

127.
128.

Id. at 252.
Id. at 253.

129. Id.
130. Pyett v. Pennsylvania Bldg. Co., 498 F.3d 88, 91 & n.3, 93-94 (2d Cir. 2007) (citing
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36,49 (1974)).
131. 14 Penn Plaza LLC, 556 U.S. at 274.
132. Id. at 257.
133. Id. at 258-60.
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the Respondents' argument that Gardner-Denver meant that a union
could not waive an employee's rights under federal anti-discrimination
statutes.134 The Court limited and distinguished Gardner-Denver by
discussing the holding from Gilmer which stated that Gardner-Denver
did not involve the enforceability of an agreement to arbitrate claims, but
rather was only about whether arbitration of contract-based claims
precluded a claimant from then pursuing judicial resolution.'3 ' Third,
the Court dismissed the arguments that the clauses did not clearly and
unmistakably require arbitration, and that the agreement operated as a
substantive waiver of ADEA rights by allowing the union to block
grievances and thus preclude union members from suing.'36 The Court
did not answer the question of whether an agreement that allows a union
to "block" claimants from vindicating their rights in the arbitral forum is
enforceable because there was only speculation that this had occurred.'"
14 Penn Plaza LLC stands for the proposition that a statutory
waiver of the judicial forum that was freely negotiated and agreed upon
by a union is fully enforceable as a matter of law. The holding makes
sense with respect to the very explicit agreement in 14 Penn Plaza LLC,
but the situation in the case may not be representative of everyday
disputes. The next section of this article discusses why 14 Penn Plaza
LLC is an oddball case, and why its reasoning should not be extended
beyond its specific facts.
2. 14 Penn PlazaLLC as an Oddball Case

The holding in 14 Penn Plaza LLC stands for the proposition that a
union can bargain away its members' rights to a judicial forum and
restrict the members to arbitration for statutory claims. The problem
with 14 Penn Plaza LLC is that the facts involved are very atypical, and
therefore its holding should not be extended beyond its specific fact
situation. This section analyzes why 14 Penn Plaza LLC meets the
elements of the oddball case and discusses how its holding should be
construed by other courts.
14 Penn Plaza LLC meets the first element of the test because it
contains atypical facts. The clause explicitly requiring arbitration of all
statutory claims is atypical of clauses found in these types of agreements

134.
135.
136.
137.

Id. at 260.
Id. at 263-64.
Id. at 272-273.
Id. at 273-74.
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because unions oppose such clauses and rarely agree to them.138 Instead,
typical collective bargaining agreements contain a clause more like the
one in the case Ibarra v. United Parcel Service.'39 Ibarra involved a
clause that stated the following:
Article 36 is a nondiscrimination provision. It states:
The Employer and the Union agree not to discriminate against any
individual with respect to hiring, compensation, terms or conditions of
employment because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex,
sexual orientation, national origin, physical disability[,] veteran status
or age in violation of any federal or state law, or engage in any other
discriminatory acts prohibited by law, nor will they limit, segregate or
classify employees in any way to deprive any individual employees of
employment opportunities because of race, color, religion, sex,
national origin, physical disability, veteran status or age in violation of
any federal or state law, or engage in any other discriminatory acts
prohibited by law.140
Unlike the clause found in Ibarra,the clause in 14 Penn Plaza LLC
specifically mentioned state and federal statutes, referenced the
grievance procedure in the agreement, and contained an express waiver

of the statutory rights.141
The second part of the oddball test is met because 14 Penn Plaza
LLC creates a significant change in the law. Prior to 14 Penn Plaza
LLC, the case Alexander v. Gardner- Denver Co. held that although a
union was able to waive certain "collective" rights, that an individual's
right to equal employment opportunities stands on different ground, and
could not be waived. 142 Although the Gilmer Court stated that statutory
claims were enforceable in arbitration, the situation in Gilmer involved
an agreement that an individual had made and signed as opposed to the
situations in 14 Penn Plaza LLC and Gardner-Denverwhich involved
the contents of collective bargaining agreements made by a union.143
Because 14 Penn PlazaLLC changes the law significantly in this area by
applying Gilmer to agreements covered by collective-bargaining

138. LAURA J. COOPER ET AL., ADR IN THE WORKPLACE, (3d ed. Forthcoming 2013)
(manuscript Ch. 9 at 32 n. 1) (on file with authors).

139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See Ibarra v. United Parcel Serv., 695 F.3d 354 (5th Cir. 2012).
Id. at 357 (alteration in original).
14 Penn Plaza LLC, 556 U.S. at 252, 254.
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 51 (1974).
Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 20 (1991).
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agreements, it meets part two of the test.
The third element is met because the change in law in 14 Penn
Plaza LLC was motivated by the odd facts and not the legal principles.
The case involved a very explicit arbitration agreement that specifically
listed the state and federal statutes it covered.'"
As discussed
previously, the agreement was atypical because most parties would not
be as explicit in their agreements.14 5 The principle, however, that such
statutory causes of action can be prospectively waived by a union in a
collective bargaining agreement, could also be applied when the facts
are more typical and the agreement is far less explicit on the waiver of
rights. These situations give rise to the major concern behind oddball
cases: a holding that is predicated on a set of oddball facts does not
"work" for the more normal situations.
14 Penn Plaza LLC will meet the fourth element of the test if its
holding is generally applied to other cases. The question that remains is
whether courts will limit its holding to agreements containing broad and
explicit waivers, or if its holding will be construed generally and the
specificity requirement will be vacated.14 6 If 14 Penn Plaza LLC is kept
within the confines of its specific facts, perhaps it is not an oddball case
at all, but instead just a narrow holding to a specific fact issue. But, if its
holding is expanded to situations with general agreements, it fits
squarely into the oddball reasoning because the Court will have used an
atypical fact situation to decide a much larger issue, and will have then
applied the holding to fact situations that are very different from those
on which the holding was predicated.
C. A T&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion
1. Case Description
The second case of the oddball trilogy is the 2011 case AT&T
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.14 7 Concepcion involved a dispute over
whether an arbitration clause in a cell-phone contract precluded class144. 14 Penn Plaza LLC, 556 U.S. at 252.
145. See supra Part III.B.2.
146. The Fifth Circuit recently applied 14 Penn Plaza LLC narrowly in Ibarra v. United
Parcel Service and held that the less specific agreement previously discussed in this article was not
enforceable as a waiver of an employee's rights to the judicial forum. Ibarra v. United Parcel Serv.,
695 F.3d 354, 359-60 (5th Cir. 2012). The Fifth Circuit's interpretation is an indication that 14
Penn PlazaLLC will be viewed narrowly, but the Court could eventually overrule the lower courts
and broaden the 14 Penn Plaza LLC holding to other cases.
147. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S.Ct. 1740 (2011).
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wide arbitration. 14 8 The Concepcions entered into an agreement for the
sale and servicing of cellular telephones with AT&T Mobility LLC
("AT&T").14 9 The agreement contained a number of consumer-friendly
provisions. 50 First, AT&T agreed to bear the cost of all "non-frivolous
claims."' 51 Second, AT&T allowed the arbitration proceeding to take
place in the county in which the customer was billed thus saving the
customer on travel costs. 152 Third, the agreement guaranteed that if the
claimant received an arbitration award greater than AT&T's last
settlement offer, AT&T would pay a minimum of $7,500, twice the
amount of the claimant's attorney's fees, and provide a guarantee that
AT&T would not seek attorney's fees.15 3 In addition to the lopsided cost
provisions, the agreement also laid out a very simple settlement
procedure, and left open the claimant's right to pursue its claim in small
claims court. 5 4 The agreement contained a clause providing for
arbitration of all disputes and required that claims be brought in the
parties' "individual capacity" only. 55 The dispute regarded whether the
Concepcions had to pay sales tax on a free phone they received.5 6
Because they did not want to pay the tax, the Concepcions filed a
suit in the Southern District of California that was later consolidated
with a putative class action alleging, "among other things, that AT&T
had engaged in false advertising and fraud by charging sales tax on
phones it advertised as free."' 57 Following the complaint, AT&T moved
to compel arbitration under the terms of the contract, and its motion was
denied when the district court found the agreement unconscionable
because AT&T had not shown that bilateral arbitration adequately
protected the claimants.' 58 The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district
court's ruling on the same grounds.' 9 The Supreme Court granted
certiorari and reversed, finding the agreement to arbitrate was fully
enforceable.160

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Id. at 1742.
Id. at 1744.
See id
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1745.
Id.
Id. at 1740.
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2. Concepcion as an Oddball Case
Like 14 Penn Plaza LLC, Concepcion is an oddball case containing
reasoning based on facts that do not accurately represent the majority of
cases before the courts. The first element of the oddball test is met
because of the presence of a very atypical cost structure. The agreement
in Concepcion contained a number of cost provisions that are completely
slanted towards the consumer.161 Each of these items are oddball facts
because they do not represent the normal agreements that are lopsided in
favor of the companies.162
The second element of the oddball test is met because Concepcion
created a significant change in the law. The lower court in Concepcion
had applied a state-law unconscionability rule from the prior case of
Discover Bank v. Superior Court,'63 which held that class-action waivers
were unconscionable if, among other things, bilateral dispute resolution
would not substitute for the deterrent effect of a class action.164
Section 2 of the Federal Arbitration Act provides that arbitration
agreements are enforceable "save upon such grounds as exist at law or in
equity for the revocation of any contract."1 65 The Supreme Court
consistently, until Concepcion, interpreted this to mean that arbitration
agreements must be treated the same as other contracts; if state law
imposes a restriction on arbitration agreements but not on other
contracts, that restriction is preempted by the FAA. 66
The Discover Bank rule would have been valid under that test
because the rule forbade unconscionable consumer class-action waivers
not only in arbitration agreements, but in any agreements, whether the
agreements contained an arbitration clause or not.167 The majority in
Concepcion, however, found that the Discover Bank rule had the effect
of discouraging arbitration by increasing the complexity of the disputeresolution process and thereby making arbitration less attractive to the
161. See id at 1744.
162. In Concepcion, the defendant (AT&T) had "gone way out of its way to ensure that
individual rights could be pursued notwithstanding the class-action waiver." Richard Bales, Is
There Any Defense to a Lopsided Arbitration Agreement?, WORKPLACE PROF. BLOG (Nov. 14,
2012),
http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof blog/2012/1 I/is-there-any-defense-to-alopsided-arbitration-agreement.html [hereinafter LopsidedArbitrationAgreement].
163. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 113 P.3d 1100, 1112 (Cal. 2005); see also Discover
Bank Laster v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 584 F.3d 849, 855 (2009).
164. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1745.
165. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2006).

166.

See Maureen A. Weston, The Death of Class ArbitrationAfter Concepcion?, 60 U. KAN.

L. REv. 767, 769 (2012).
167. 113P.3datl12.
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AT&Ts of the world.168 This ruling - that the FAA preempts generally
applicable state contract rules that have the effect of discouraging
arbitration - represents a significant change in law and an equally
significant extension of the FAA into an area previously reserved (both
by precepts of federalism and seemingly by the text of the FAA section
2 itself) for state law.16 9
The third part of the test is satisfied because Concepcion's atypical
facts and not the legal precedent motivated the decision. The cost
scheme and the lopsided dispute procedure are atypical for a consumer
contract of adhesion. 7 o The fact that all aspects of the agreement
weighed heavily in favor of the consumer made this an easy case for the
Court to make a pro-arbitration and potentially politically unpopular
ruling. Despite the fact that the consumer could not proceed as a class,
the consumer still could be made whole under a very favorable
agreement.
The fourth part of the oddball test illustrates the problem in
Concepcion. It is true that the consumer could easily have been made
whole through the dispute policy, and in this case the only thing the
consumer lost was the right to proceed as a class. The problem is that
most agreements do not provide such easy resolution for the consumer.
If the holding of Concepcion is applied to situations in which the
agreement is more typical and is not lopsided toward the consumer, the
consumers will effectively be left without a remedy. For this reason, it
is important that Concepcion's holding be limited to the specific fact
situation provided in the case, if at all. Concepcion clearly meets the
four-part oddball test and is another example of the Court using an
atypical fact situation to create an unpopular, binding precedent to
further its liberal policy favoring arbitration.
D. Italian Colors Restaurant v. American Express Travel Related
Servs. Co.
1. Case Description
Italian Colors Restaurant v. American Express Travel Related

168. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1750.
169. Richard Bales, Supremes Uphold Arbitral Class-Action Waivers, WORKPLACE PROF.
BLOG (Apr. 27, 2011), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/laborprof blog/2011/04/supreme-upholdarbitral-class-action-waivers.html [hereinafter Class-Action Waivers].
170. LopsidedArbitrationAgreement, supra note 162.
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Servs. Co., is another case involving a class-action waiver.171 In Italian
Colors, the plaintiffs represented "all merchants that have accepted
American Express charge cards ... and have thus been forced to agree
to accept American Express credit and debit cards."l72 The dispute
centered on a portion of the card agreement called the "Honor All
Cards" provision.173 The provision required merchants that only
accepted certain American Express cards as payment to accept all
American Express cards as payment.174 American Express previously
centered its business on wealthy customers and corporations.'" Thus
the typical American Express customer was particularly attractive to
merchants.1 76 Because American Express customers were attractive to
merchants, American Express was able to withhold larger fees than
normal mass-market credit cards when its cards were used.17 7 The
merchants' acceptance of higher fees was conditioned on the fact that
the cards were held only by attractive customers.' 78 The merchants
alleged that American Express violated the Sherman Act because it
expanded its business into a "mass-market" business and forced them
through its "Honor All Cards" provision to accept higher fees (originally
designed only for the affluent customers and corporations) even when
the customers were much less attractive. 179
The merchants and American Express were parties to a standard
"Card Acceptance Agreement" that contained a mandatory arbitration
clause for all disputes unless the merchant filed its claim in small claims
court.o80 The arbitration clause also contained a class-action waiver for
claims "subject to arbitration."' 8 ' The merchants asserted that American
Express' attempt to force them to "Honor All Cards" provided them with
the unattractive options of either paying the very high fees or losing a
large share of their customers, and thus claimed this is a violation of the
Sherman Act.182 The merchants then argued they were unable to
vindicate the antitrust rights by pursuing this case individually because
171.
2012).

Italian Colors Rest. v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., 667 F.3d 204 (2d Cir.

172.

Id. at 207.

173.

Id. at 208.

174.

Id.

175.
176.
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 207.
Id.
Id. at 208.
See id at 207-08.
Idat 208.

180.

Id. at 209.

181.
182.

Id.
Id. at 208.
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of the high prohibitive costs of doing so. 83 The question before the
Second Circuit was whether the class-action arbitration waiver was
enforceable when the practical effect of enforcement was that the
plaintiffs would be unable to vindicate their statutory rights.184
The court applied the 1991 case Green Tree Financial Corp. v.
Randolph that noted that an arbitration agreement with cost provisions
such that a plaintiff could not vindicate its statutory rights may be
unenforceable if the plaintiff meets their "burden of showing the
likelihood of incurring such costs."' 85 Here, the court found that since
the merchants' only economically feasible option was through a class
action, the agreement was unenforceable because forcing arbitration and
declining to allow a class-action would render the merchants unable to
vindicate their statutory rights.'86 The Supreme Court recently granted
certiorari to review the Second Circuit's decision.' 87 The next section of
this article discusses why Italian Colors is an oddball case, and predicts
that the Court will reverse the Second Circuit.
2. Italian Colors as an Oddball Case
Italian Colors is currently before the Court. 8 8 This section
discusses how Italian Colors is an atypical fact situation, and opines that
the Court will reverse the holding of the Second Circuit in yet another
pro-arbitration ruling.
Italian Colors meets the first element of the oddball test because its
facts are atypical.'8 9 The plaintiffs in Italian Colors are merchants who
are at least to some degree sophisticated parties.19
Merchants are
positioned differently than the average consumer that is bound by credit
card agreements. Merchants have more financial resources, more
experience in commercial dealings, and more ability to protect their
183. Id. at 217. As support, the merchants offered an expert opinion that the cost would be
somewhere between "$300 thousand and $2 million" to get the expert assistance they would need in
such an antitrust case. Id.
184. Id. at 212.
185. 531 U.S. 79, 90-92 (2000).
186. Italian Colors Rest., 667 F.3d at 219.
187. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 594 (2012).
188. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 1236 (2013).
189. "Plaintiffs are merchants who have sued American Express over the terms AmEx
imposes on merchants who accept AmEx credit cards from consumers. Thus, the Court will have
the opportunity to issue yet another pro-arbitration ruling in a context that hides the anticonsumer/employee effect the ruling will have on the vast majority of cases now subject to the
FAA." LopsidedArbitrationAgreement, supra note 162.
190. See Italian Colors Rest., 667 F.3d at 207.
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interests than the everyday consumer.' 9'
Italian Colors meets the second element of the test because it will
likely create a significant change in the law, in two ways. First, the
Court in Green Tree Financial Corp v. Randolph held that arbitration
agreements can be invalidated because of high-prohibitive costs;192
allowing the Italian Colors arbitration agreement to be enforced
notwithstanding prohibitive costs will change the law. Second, the
Court in Italian Colors seems primed to eviscerate a defense that many
lower courts have used to strike down lopsided arbitration agreements:
that enforcing an arbitration agreement containing lopsided terms in a
case involving statutory claims (in the employment context, typically
employment discrimination claims) would interfere with the vindication
After Concepcion eviscerated the
of federal statutory rights.193
unconscionability defense to lopsided arbitration agreements, the one
defense left is that they interfere with the vindication of federal statutory
rights.194 "In other words, when a lopsided arbitration agreement forces
a court to choose between enforcing the FAA on the one hand and
vindicating Title VII rights on the other, courts should choose the
latter."1' If the Court, as expected eliminates this defense,19 6 that will
represent a significant change in law and an equally significant
"promotion" of the FAA into a statute with primacy over all federal
substantive statutes.19
Third, if the Court reverses, the decision may be based upon the
atypical facts as opposed to the legal principles. The principle contained
in Green Tree is fairly straightforward. If there is a case that meets the
Green Tree cost requirement, it is Italian Colors. However, the atypical
fact of the parties being merchants as opposed to the Green Tree
principle might motivate the ruling. The Court will likely rule in favor
of American Express for four reasons. First, despite the fact that it
would be impractical to do so, the merchants are able to advance their
claims individually. Second, the Court will argue that the plain language
of the FAA trumps the policies behind Title VII and other federal
statutes. Third, the Court will argue that the FAA trumps later written
statutes because if Congress wanted to preclude arbitration in the

191.
192.
193.
194.

See id at 207-08.
Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90-92 (2000).
LopsidedArbitrationAgreement, supra note 162.
Id.

195.

Id.

196.
197.

Id.
Id.
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statutes, it could have easily placed a waiver in them. Fourth, the Court
will use the oddball fact that the parties were merchants to hold them
more accountable to the agreements they sign. If the Court uses these
four reasons, especially the fact that the parties are merchants in
reaching its decision, it will have used a set of atypical facts to come to
its holding.
The fourth element of the test is met because the Court's holding
will create a serious concern for other parties in these types of disputes.
The Court's destruction of the "interfered with enforcement of federalstatutory rights" defense will have an effect not only on sophisticated
parties like the merchants in Italian Colors, but will also affect nonsophisticated consumers and employees. The ruling will come "in a
context that hides the anti-consumer/employee effect the ruling will have
on the vast majority of cases now subject to the FAA."l 98 The Court's
position seems logical in the sophisticated party context, but it really is
not logical if applied outside of the sophisticated party context precisely the oddball problem. This article stands for the proposition
that the two situations are different, but argues that the Court will use
this oddball situation involving sophisticated parties to create a proarbitration holding that will extend to non-sophisticated parties like
consumers and employees. Many other cases involving consumer and
business arbitration agreements such as Green Tree have been applied in
the employment setting,'9 9 and this case would seem to be no different.
IV. ANALYSIS
The Supreme Court has chosen for its arbitration docket a set of
cases with wholly atypical fact patterns in what appears to be a
deliberate effort - successful so far - to advance its pro-arbitration
policy agenda without provoking a political backlash. This section first
identifies the Court's pro-arbitration agenda. It then discusses how the
Court has used a series of oddball cases to further that agenda. This
section then concludes by discussing why the Court's use of oddball
arbitration cases creates bad arbitration law.
A. The Court's Pro-ArbitrationAgenda
The Court's pro-arbitration bias can be demonstrated in two ways.
198.
199.

Id.
See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 (2000).
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The first is its outcome-oriented jurisprudence. Over the last several
decades, the Court has never seen an arbitration clause that it did not
like, except in the rare case in which the arbitration clause disfavors a
politically or economically powerful party.2 00 One prominent scholar
has characterized the Court's results-oriented arbitration jurisprudence
as "among the worst examples in the Court's history."2 01
The second piece of evidence of the Court's pro-arbitration agenda
is its willingness to abandon its textual approach in reviewing
agreements under the FAA. Justice Scalia is arguably the strongest
textualist on the Court. Ironically, he is also the drafter of the majority
opinion in Concepcion.20 2 In his opinions, Justice Scalia often
demonstrates his textual principles. In Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore
Services Inc., Justice Scalia wrote "statutory prohibitions often go
beyond the principal evil to cover reasonably comparable evils, and it is
ultimately the provisions of our laws rather than the principal concerns
of our legislators by which we are governed." 2 03 Despite Justice Scalia's
strong preference toward textualism demonstrated in Oracle, in
Concepcion, he was willing to completely ignore the text of the FAA in
enforcing an agreement to arbitrate despite the presence of a legitimate
contract defense under well-established California law.204 The only
plausible conclusion for this abandonment of textualism is the Court's
pro-arbitration agenda.
B. The Court has Recently Used Oddball Cases to Advance its Agenda
The Court has recently used three oddball cases to advance its proarbitration agenda. This section reviews how each of these oddball cases
is being used to further the Court's agenda.
First, in 14 Penn Plaza LLC, the Court held a clause requiring the
submission of claims to arbitration was binding on an individual despite
the fact that the clause was negotiated by a union on behalf of that
individual.205 14 Penn Plaza LLC involved a very specific arbitration
clause that was abnormal in the sense that most unions and employers

200. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Tainted Love: An Increasingly Odd Arbitral Infatuation in
Derogation ofSound and ConsistentJurisprudence,60 U. KAN. L. REV. 795, 798 (2012).
201. Id at 800-801.
202. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740, 1744 (2011).
203. Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Svcs., Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 79 (1998).
204. Conception, 131 S. Ct. at 1748, 1753.
205. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247, 273-74 (2009).
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would not have agreed to it because it was so specific.206 14 Penn Plaza
LLC was an attempt by the Court to take an arbitration clause that was
extremely atypical, and to create a holding that could be applied anytime
a union negotiated a waiver, not just when the waiver was so specific
like in the case.
Second, in Concepcion, the Court used an abnormal situation
involving an arbitration agreement to advance its agenda.
The
arbitration clause in question was very lopsided toward the consumer,
and allowed the consumer to easily be made whole. The problem is, not
all arbitration agreements are so friendly. By using a very pro-consumer
arbitration agreement to destroy the unconscionability defense, the Court
was able to provide a smokescreen to its anti-consumer ruling. If the
Court would have destroyed the unconscionability defense in an
agreement that provided a consumer no other means of relief, its holding
would have been far more politically unpopular. In this case, the
consumer had other means of relief, but the Court's rule, if applied to
agreements that favor the business, would have resulted in the opposite.
Third, in Italian Colors, the Court has again taken a case with
extremely atypical facts and is likely in the process of creating yet
another pro-arbitration ruling predicated upon an oddball situation. In
Italian Colors, the parties to a credit card agreement are merchants.207
In order to litigate their dispute individually, the merchants will have to
incur significant costs. The Court will likely in this case bind the
merchants to their agreement to arbitrate individually despite the
presence of the high costs because of "their sophistication." The holding
may seem reasonable in this case with a sophisticated party, but might
be very disadvantageous if it is applied to non-sophisticated parties like
the everyday consumer. The Court is currently reviewing the case and,
thus, it is unknown what the outcome will be.
Each of these cases demonstrates how the Court has chosen cases
with strange fact patterns to create broad holdings applicable to other
cases, many with far different facts. The next section discusses why this
is problematic for society as a matter of public policy.
C. Why CreatingPolicy with Oddball Cases is Bad
Creating public policy using oddball cases to create precedent is a

206.
207.
2012).

See supra Part III.B.2.
Italian Colors Rest. v. Am. Express Travel Related Servs. Co., 667 F.3d 204, 207 (2d Cit.
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bad idea because it permits the Court to create legal rules that, while
perhaps creating a just outcome in the oddball cases themselves, create
unjust outcomes in the typical cases that much more commonly appear
in the lower courts. Before 14 Penn PlazaLLC, Concepcion, and Italian

Colors, employees and consumers had two strong defenses. Employees
and consumers could assert the unconscionability defense or the
"interferes-with-vindication-of-statutory-rights" defense in order to
escape the arbitration agreement.208 In the three oddball cases, the Court
used atypical cases (in 14 Penn Plaza LLC a case involving an
abnormally specific waiver of rights; 209 in Concepcion a case involving
arbitral provisions abnormally skewed to favor the consumer; 210 in
Italian Colors involving an atypical party, the sophisticated merchant 2')
to eviscerate these two important defenses. The problem is the new rule
gutting these defenses will apply not only to arbitration agreements with
procedures that favor the weaker party, but also to the far more typical
agreements where arbitral procedures are stacked against the weaker
consumer or employee. Because of these new rules, the weaker party
will be forced to arbitrate, but will be left without the two previous
defenses. This illustrates the general principle that using oddball cases
to create precedent is a bad idea because it allows the Court to create
legal rules based on abnormal factual situations that will later adversely
affect a disadvantaged party.
V. CONCLUSION

Over the past thirty years, the Supreme Court has dramatically
expanded arbitration doctrine. Beginning in the 1980's, the Court has
expanded arbitration doctrine to include arbitrability of almost any
dispute.2 12 More recently, the Supreme Court has chosen for its
arbitration docket a set of cases with wholly atypical fact patterns in a
deliberate effort - successful so far - to advance its pro-arbitration

policy agenda without provoking a political backlash.2 13 These cases
and the expansion of arbitration doctrine should be limited to ensure that

208.
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

See, e.g., Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79, 90-92 (2000).
14 Penn Plaza, 556 U.S. at 251.
Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. at 1744.
See Italian Colors Rest., 667 F.3d at 207.
See supra Part II.B.3.
See, e.g., 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, 556 U.S. 247 (2009); AT&T Mobility LLC v.

Concepcion, 131 S. Ct. 1740 (2011); Italian Colors Rest. v. Am. Express Travel Related Serv. Co.,
667 F.3d 204 (2012).

http://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlelj/vol30/iss2/6

28

Bales and Gerano: Oddball Arbitration
2013]

ODDBALL ARBITRATION

433

parties are afforded a fair opportunity to resolve their disputes.
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